FEDERAL TAXATION: SECTION 7421 (a) OF INTERNAL
REVENUE CODE LITERALLY CONSTRUED TO BAN ALL
SUITS TO ENJOIN ASSESSMENT OR COLLECTION OF
TAXES
SECTION 7421 (a) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 guards
against judicial impairment of the prescribed system for summary
collection of federal taxes' by providing (with stated exceptions)
that "no suit for the purpose of restraining the assessment or collection of any tax shall be maintained in any court."2 On its face,
this statutory language would appear categorically to remove equity
jurisdiction from the courts and to require a protesting taxpayer to
seek correction through the prescribed method of a refund suit.s
Nevertheless, upon a showing of "exceptional and extraordinary circumstances," an exception occasionally has been read into the
statute's unqualified provisions.4 In the recent case of Enochs v.
Williams Packing& Nav. Co.,' however, the Supreme Court appears
to have eliminated this exception by literally construing the statute's
prohibitive mandates.
The Williams Packing and Navigation Company petitioned a
federal district court to enjoin the collection of social security taxes
due on the wages paid to crews working aboard its fishing vessels.6
The taxpayer's petition said: (1) there is no employer-employee
relationship between the company and the crew to support imposition of the tax 7 and (2) there is no adequate remedy at law because
IStatutory methods for orderly tax collection are set out in INT. REV. Coa of 1954,

§§ 6301-04. See also seizure provisions note 30 infra. See generally S P-H 1962
TAx S

V.

FED.

19791-933.

2 The prohibition is based on the theory that the revenue laws contain an integrated system of corrective justice which is intended to be used to the exclusion of
all other remedies in settling disputes over tax matters. See Graham v. DuPont, 262
U.S. 234 (1923); Snyder v. Marks, 109 U.S. 189 (1883); Cheatham v. United States, 92
U.S. 85 (1876); cf. Phillips v. Commissioner, 283 U.S. 589, 595 (1931). But see,
Kimmel v. Tomlinson, 151 F. Supp. 901 (S.D. Fla. 1957), which refutes this view.
'Statutory provision for a refund suit is contained in INr. REV. COD)E of 1954, § 7422.
See cases cited note 22 infra. See generally 9 MERTENS, FEDRAL INCOME TAXA'rbN
49.212 (rev. ed. 1961).

5370 U.S. 1 (1962).
' The taxes determined were the Federal Insurance Contributions Tax, INr. Rv.
CoDe of 1954, §§ 3101-25; and the Federal Unemployment Tax, INr. Rav. CoDE of

§§ 8301-08.
1954,
7

The INr. REV. CODE of 1954, § 3121 (d) (2) defines an employee as "any individual
who, under the usual common law rules applicable in determining the employer-
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enforced collection of the tax would place the company in bank.
ruptcy before a suit for refund could be brought. The district
court rejected the Government's contention that section 7421 (a)
removed the subject matter of tax collection from the court's jurisdiction and heard the petition on the ground that the taxpayer had
shown an "extraordinary circumstance" justifying resort to equity.8
After asserting its jurisdiction, the court found that the tax was invalidly determined and accordingly exercised its equity power to
grant the injunction. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
affirmed the district court decree.9 On a writ of certiorari, however,
the Supreme Court reversed and ordered the petition to be dismissed
on the ground that section 7421 (a) rendered federal courts powerless
to hear suits to enjoin the assessment or collection of federal taxes.
At common law the power to hear petitions seeking injunctions
against the assessment or collection of taxes was unquestioned.1 0
However, before a court would issue an injunction, an aggrieved taxpayer had to show that the Government was seeking to collect an.
illegal tax and that his legal remedies were inadequate 1 1 Consequently, when Congress enacted the injunctive prohibition now
found in section 7421 (a),' 2 taxpayers construed it to be merely a
employee relationship, has the status of an employee." Under the common law,
factors in determining one's status as an employee included degree of control, opportunity for profit or loss, investment in facilities, permanency of relation, and skill
required, Schwing v. United States, 165 F.2d 518 (3d Cir. 1948); Atlantic Coast Life'
Ins. Co. v. United States, 76 F. Supp. 627 (E.D.S.C. 1948).
In the instant case, the taxpayer maintained that since it did not exercise sufficient
control over the alleged employees, they were independent contractors and thus no taxes
were
owed.
8
Williams Packing & Nav. Co. v. Enochs, 176 F. -Supp: 168 (S.D. Miss. 1959).
9
11 Enochs v. Williams Packing 8- Nay. Co.,'291 F.2d 402 .(Sth Cir. 1961).
0See Miller v. Standard Nut; Margarine Co., 284 U.S. 498, 509 (1932); Gorovitz,
Federal Tax Injunctions and the Standard Nut Cases, 10 TAxEs 446 (1932). See
generally 4 CoorEY, TAXATiON
1640-42 (4th ed. 1924).
"See, e.g., Miller v. Standard Nut Margarine Co., supra note 10, at 509; Hanne.
winkle v. Georgetowni 82 U.S. 547 (1872); Dows v,Chicago, 78 U.S. 108 (1870).
The common law distinction between the existence and exercise of jurisdiction is
succinctly stated in i Po,%MERoY, EqurrY JURISPRUDENCE § 130 at 156 (4th ed. 1918):
"Equity jurisdiction ... is the power to hear certain kinds and classes of civil cases
according to the principles of the method and. procedure adopted by the court of
chancery, and to decide them in accordance with the'doctrine and rules of equity
jurisprudence...."
2 The prohibition first became law in 1867 as an amendment to a previous revenue
act. Revenue Act of 1867, ch. 169, § 10, 14 Stat. 471. The amendment stated that
'I[N]o suit for the purpose of restraining the assessment or collection of tax shall be
maintained in any court." Later this prohibition by itself became § 3224 of the
1875 Reviled Stathtes. Both'§ 2653 of the INT.R. CODE Of 1939 and § 7421 (a) bf the
Iwr: Rv. CoDE of 1954 substantially repeated the 1875 statute; except for the addition-

Vol. 1963:175]

FEDERAL TAXATION

codification of the common law.' 3 Since the purpose of the provision
was uncertain, 4 their interpretation appeared to be reasonable.
However, when met with this contention in early cases, the Supreme
Court rejected it and made it clear that the statute was meant to
replace the common law and categorically proscribe equitable
relief.15 The new statutory provision was thus interpreted to be a
jurisdictional limitation which deprived United States courts of the.
power to entertain any suits involving tax collections.
This literal construction was short-lived, however, and it was not
long before dicta in two cases injected doubt into the previous pro-,
nouncements of unqualified prohibition. 3 In these cases it was
stated, without adequate explanation, that while the statute generally prohibited maintenance of suits to enjoin collection of taxes,
its provisions could be disregarded in cases involving "extraordinary
and entirely exceptional circumstances." Shortly thereafter in Hill
v. Wallace' the Supreme Court gave meaning to these words by
holding that the prospect of financial ruin was such an "extraordinary and exceptional circumstance" as to allow a court to -contravene the statute and entertain a taxpayer's petition for injunction.
The efficacy of the Hill decision was somewhat mitigated however,
because the Court found that the tax as imposed by the Future
Trading Act, was in essence a penalty to enforce the regulation of
grain trades and not a proper exercise of the taxing power. On this
of the explicit redetermination exceptions which create a special statutory right to
petition to the Tax Court for judicial determination of liability prior to payment of
income, estate and gift taxes. For provisions of these redetermination exceptions, see
note 28 infra.
Is The taxpayers maintained that since the statute was declaritory of the common law, the prohibition against injunctive relief applied, only to the exercise of
equity jurisdiction and not to the existence of equity jurisdiction. Hence they claimed
that it was a question for the court whether equity could act in view of the prohibition as applied to the circumstances of each particular case. See, e.g., Graham v.
DuPont, 262 U.S. 234 (1923); Bailey v. George, 259 U.S. 16 (1922); Snyder v. Marks,
109 U.S. 189 (1883); Gorovitz, supra note 10 at 447 n. 7; see generally 9 MERTENS, Op.
cit. supra note 4, at
49.210-12.
11 Concerning the dearth of legislative comment and history, see Note, 49 HAav. L.
REv. 109 n.9 (1935).
1
See, e.g., Graham v. DuPont, 262 U.S. 284 (1923); Dodge v. Brady, 240 U.S. 12
(1916); Snyder v. Marks, 109 U.S. 189 (1883); 9 MERTENS, Op. cit. supra note 4, at
§ 49.210 n. 24. See generally Gorovitz, supra note 10, at 446. But see Gall, Enjoining

the United States, 10 VA. L. REv. 194, 203 (1923), where the author asserts that the
statute did not change the common law.
" See Dodge v. Osborn, 240 U.S. 118 (1916) (income tax); and Bailey v. George,
259 U.S. 16 (1922) (Federalf Child Labor Tax).
- 259 U.S. 44 (1922).
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DuPont8

basis, Graham v.
distinguished the Hill case as involving
a penalty and not a tax so as not to come under the provisions of
the statute. Then, in Miller v. Standard Nut Margarine Co.,19 the
Supreme Court added further doubt as to the meaning of the statute
by appearing to sanction the previously rejected view that the prohibition was, in fact, a codification of the common law. 20 After
Miller the uncertainty surrounding the meaning of the statutory
prohibition was reflected by a split among the lower courts. While
many courts refused to hear petitions to enjoin the assessment or
collection of a tax,2 1 other courts entertained such petitions, but
appeared to be uncertain as to when jurisdiction should attach.22
By unmistakably reaffirming its original interpretation that the
statute operates as a complete bar to jurisdiction, the Supreme Court
in the Enochs case finally settled the confusion surrounding section
7421 (a). In so holding, however, the Court did not overrule Miller
v. Standard Nut Margarine Co., but rather distinguished it on the
ground that there the determination was patently illegal, hence only
an "exaction in the guise of a tax" and thus not a proper subject of
the statute.23 The Court went on to emphasize, however, that so
Is 262 U.S. 234, 258 (1923).
9 284 U.S. 498 (1932).

-'Justices Stone and Brandeis dissented on the ground that the statute precluded injunctive relief "whatever the equities alleged." Id. at 511.
For support of the view that the Miller decision adopted the common law, see
Gorovitz, stipra note 10, at 446; Note, 27 GEo. L.J. 237 (1938); Note, 49 HARV. L. Ray.
109, 112 (1935); cf. Shelton v. Platt, 139 U.S. 591, 594 (1891); 9 MmT=NS, op, Cit. supra
note 4 at 49.212; compare Miller, Restraining the Collection of Federal Taxes and
Penalties by Injunction, 71 U. PA. L. REV. 318, 339 (1923), where the author
concludes that all courts considered the statute to be merely a declaration of the
common law.
2'See, e.g., Homan Mfg. Co. v. Long, 242 F.2d 645 (7th Cir. 1957) (courts should
not deviate from the clear Congressional direction expressed in § 7421 (a)): Kaus v.
Huston, 120 F.2d 183 (8th Cir. 1941) (a suit may be maintained only to enjoin the
collection of a pseudo tax); Communist Party v. Moysey, 141 F. Supp. 382 (S.D.N.Y.
1956) (exceptions are more logically and properly catalogued as cases based upon
factual situ;ions in which § 7421 (a) is not applicable).
22
Some eases appeared to follow the common law view and hold that jurisdic.
tion pre-existed and would be exercised upon a showing of an inadequate legal
remedy and proof of illegality. See, e.g., Allen v. Regents, 304 U.S. 439 (1939);
Lasoff v. Grey, 266 F2d 745 (6th Cir. 1959); Shelton v. Gill, 202 F.2d 503 (4th Cir,
1953); Huston v. Iowa Soap Co., 85 F.2d 649 (8th Cir. 1986).
Others, however, appeared to follow the approach used in Hill v. Wrallace, 259
U.S. 44 (1922), and did not allow jurisdiction to be asserted until a taxpayer had first
shown an "extraordinary and exceptional circumstance" that compelled resort to equity.
See, e.g., John M. Hirst & Co. v. Gentsch, 133 F.2d 247 (6th Cir. 1943) (collection
would force the closing of coal mines); Midwest Haulers v. Brady, 128 F.2d 496
(6th Cir. 1942) (collection would result in cessation of trucking business and forfeiture
of common carrier certificate).
23 370 U.S. at 7.
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long as there is some theory by which the Government can establish

its claim, the determination is considered a tax within the prohibition
of the statute, and regardless of the equities alleged, a court is powerless to look any further.2 4 To allow otherwise, reasoned the Court,

would frustrate the central purpose of 'section 7421 (a) which is to
assure the United States of prompt collection of its lawful revenue.
In reaching the decision in the instant case, the Court didhtot

take notice of the fact that the central purpose which. it imputes to
the statute has been abrogated in the three major fields of taxation.

At an early date Congress recognized.:that allowing an appeal for
judicial determination only after payment of a tax often subjected
taxpayers to an undue hardship.r Therefore, it established the

Board of Tax Appeals (now the Tax Court) 26 where a petition for
judicial redetermination of income, estate, and giff"tboxes was ex-

pressly allowed prior to payment.2? Section 7421 (a) expliatly provides for this exception by exempting from its general provisions.'any
redeterminations properly before that court. 28
s&UT]he question of whether the Government has a chance of ultimatly pr<.
vailing is to be determined on the basis of the information available to it at the

time of the suit. Only'if it is then apparent that, under the most liberal view of
the law and the facts, the United States cannot establish its claim, may the suit for an
injunction be maintained." Ibid.
2OSee H.R. REP.' No. 179, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1924) where it-is stated that
"although a taxpayer may, after payment of his .;ax, bring suit for the recovery thereof
and tlus 'secure a judicial determination on the questions involved, he can not in view
of section 3224 of the Revised Statutes (now § 7421 (a) of the Int. Rev. Code of 1954]
which prohibits suits to enjoin the collection of taxes, secure such a determination
prior to the payment of the tax. The right of appeal after payment of the tax is*an
incomplete remedy, and does little to remove the hardship occasioned by an incorrect
assessment. The payment of a large additional tax . . . sometimes forces;taxpayers
into bankruptcy and often causes great financial hardship and sacrifice. These
results are not remedied by permitting the taxpayer to sue for the recovery of the
tax after payment. He is entitled to an appeal and to a determination of his liability
for the tax prior to payment." The Senate Committee on Finance filed a similar
report. See S. Em'. No. 898, 68th Cong, 1st. Sess. 8 (1924).
26 Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, § 900, 43 Stat. 336 (now INT. REV. CODE of 1954,

§§ 7441.93).

27 For the jurisdiction of the Tax Court, see INT. REV. CODE of- 1954, § 7442. See
generally 9 MEaRTNs, op. dt. supra note 4, at 50.08 n. 68.
,l Section 7421 (a) is inapplicable where the Commissioner has determined a defiiency of income, estate or gift tixes under §§ 6212 (a), (c) of the 1954 Code providing the taxpayer has filed a timely petition for redetermination of such deficiency
by the Tax Court, as provided in § 6213 (a). In such situations no assessment or
collection of a tax is to be made until a final determination is rendered by the Tax
Court. Section 6213 (a) expressly provides that the making of an assessment or
levy prior thereto may be enjoined unless under § 6861 the Secretary of the Treisury
or his delegates believe that the assessment or collection of a deficiency will be
jeopardized by delay.
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A taxpayer without recourse to the Tax Court may even have
methods available by which to litigate the issue of his liability without first making full payment of a determination. While generally
full payment is necessary in order to institute a refund suit,20 if the
determination is divisible into a series of separate, identifiable transactions or events, the taxpayer may pay a portion of the tax, institute
a suit for refund and litigate the issue of his liability for the whole
determination.30 Another possible method of avoiding the full payment rule in the case of a social security tax would be for one of the
taxpayer's alleged employees to pay his portion of the tax himself,
then personally institute suit for a refund on the ground that he
was not an employee and thus did not owe any tax. 31 If the decision
should result in a finding that the necessary employer-employee relationship was lacking, then the alleged employer could conceivably
use this finding as a basis for showing that the determination was
patently invalid and thus establish equitable jurisdiction within the
rule in Enochs 32 Such a decision could also result in an abatement
of the determination against the employer.33
"See Flora v. United States, 362 U.S. 145 (1960).
,DSee Flora v. United States, id. at 171-75 nn. 37 & 38; Steele v. United States, 280
F.2d 89 (8th Cir. 1960).
Since the decision in the instant case, the Williams Packing and Navigation
Company has sought to invoke this exception by making payment of the amount
claimed to be due for one quarter and suing for a refund. Both the Internal
Revenue Service and the Department of Justice have informed petitioner, however,
that they plan to challenge the divisibility of sodal security taxes. Respondent's
Petition for Rehearing, p. 5. Also, the Government will probably contend that the
tax in the instant case is not divisible because it is subject to credits and exemptions
due to the nature of the taxpayer's business which make it impossible to determine
accurately the amount due for a single quarter. Brief for Respondent, p. 15. For a
case supporting the position that a tax subject to credits and exemptions is not
divisible, see Jones v. Fox, 162 F. Supp. 449, 468 (D. Md. 1957).
"'The Federal Insurance Contributions Act, INT. REV. CODE of 1954, §§3101-2,
imposes a like tax on both the employer and the employee. While the employer is the
collection agent for the tax on the employee and is liable for the tax regardless of
whether or not it is collected, there does not appear to be any reason why the
employee could not pay his portion of the tax himself and seek to establish his own
non-liability. See INT. RaV. CODE of 1954 § 3121.
32 The prior judgment could be viewed as establishing that the tax was patently
invalid so as not to be subject to the provisions of § 7421 (a). Therefore the Govern.
ment could conceivably be collaterally estopped to deny the illegality of the tax
in a subsequent petition for an injunction brought by the alleged employer and the
patent illegality test would be met in the pleadings. Concerning the effect of such
a prior judgment as collateral estoppel against the Government, see Developments in
the Law-Res Judicata, 65 HARv. L. Rav. 818, 840-65 (1952); cf. Bernhard v. Bank
of America, 19 Cal. 2d 807, 122 P.2d 892 (1942); Coca-Cola Co. v. Pepsi-Cola Co.,
36 Del. 124, 132-34, 172 Ad. 260- 263-65 (Super. Ct. 1934). See generally I Mooim,
FEDERAL PRAcTicE

0.401 (2d ed. 1961).

"P rovisions for abatement are found in the INT. REv.

CODE

of 1954, § 6404.
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However, these alternatives to full payment are dependent upon
failure of the Government to make immediate collection, 34 and they
are at best only possibilities which do not cover all situations. Consequently, by removing recourse to equity in determinations not
within the statutory jurisdiction of the Tax Court, the Enochs
decision may deny to a taxpayer access to both equitable relief and
legal process until after an irreparable injury has been inflicted.
3' If payment is not made within ten days after notice and demand the tax authorities are entitled to seize the taxpayers property in order to satisfy the claim. INT.
REV. COnE of 1954, §§ 6331-44. 'For collection by distraint, see generally 3 P-H 1962
Fa. TAX SEnv.
19801-28.

